Art is a biological puzzle, because it drains time and resources that might otherwise be used to promote an individual’s fitness. Unfortunately, the evolution of aesthetics in art is not an advanced area of psychological science: at present there are more ideas about the possible adaptive origins of art than there are data verifying them. Complicating the topic is the fact that there are people who are hostile to the idea that any human behaviour could ever be shown to be an evolved adaptation, and people who write as if all behaviour must be adaptive but do not apply scientific rigour to their argument.

Why does art appear to be a human universal? Could it be a biological adaptation whose function we have failed to notice? I argue otherwise: that art is a by-product of other adaptations rather than being an adaptation itself.

If not 100 per cent universal, then art certainly is extraordinarily widespread, and has characteristic features across diverse cultures. The late Denis Dutton, author of *The Art Instinct*, usefully listed a number of criteria by which art can be identified:

- Art is not practical, like a tool or a house.
- It requires the exercise of specialised skill.
- It is considered to be a source of pleasure.
- Art is made in recognisable styles.
- There are rules that form the composition of artworks.
- Art is judged and appreciated.
- At least in part, it represents or imitates some experience of the world.
- The pleasure that it causes is intended by the artist, rather than being an accident.
- People designate the experience of appreciating art as special.
- It involves some kind of imaginative experience: people are prompted by art to visualise or imagine some aspect of the world.

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Wall paintings in the Chauvet-Font-de-Queyras Cave France, Upper Palaeolithic, approximately 30,000–35,000 BP

The limestone cave of Chauvet, in the Ardèche River valley in southern France, is lined with the earliest known figurative paintings in Europe. There are hundreds of animals, of at least thirteen different species, including horses, aurochs, minirhinos, lions, panthers, lynx, ibex, ibex-antelopes and rhinocerous.
Stag Hunt, China, Northern Song (960–1127) or Jin (1115–1234) dynasty
Attributed to Huang Zongdao

**A Break Away!**
1891
Tom Roberts

Trevi Fountain
Rome
1732–62
Funerary army of Qin Shi Huang,  First Emperor of China  
China, Xi’an, Shaanxi Province  
210 – 209 BCE

Marilyn (Vanitas)  
1977  
Audrey Flack

Wanjina figures  
Drysdale River, Central Kimberley, Australia, Nganinyin people
The first criterion—that, almost by definition, art is not practical—raises the question of why it exists, given that anything that does not immediately enhance fitness should be selected against since it involves the diversion of time and energy that could be spent on surviving and reproducing. Hence the question of whether art could possibly be a biological adaptation.

It is important to think clearly about the question before attempting an answer. First and foremost, ‘Is art a biological adaptation?’ must be distinguished from such questions as ‘Is art valuable? Desirable? Healthy? Worthwhile? Deserving of support?’ and so on.

In many people’s minds, the question of whether art is a biological adaptation gets blurred with questions about its worth. But in fact the question ‘Is art a biological adaptation?’ is not a referendum on whether art is to be valued, treasured or valorised. It is a question about ‘adaptation’ in the biologist’s strict sense: ‘Is art a heritable trait that enhanced the reproductive rate of our ancestors?’

I believe that it is a confusion between these two questions that makes most hypotheses about art’s adaptive function seem so lame and flabby—for example, the theory that the biological function of art is to bring us together as a community, to see the world in new ways, or to feel at one with the cosmos. Such observations are certainly not false. It’s just that they should not be confused with a hypothesis about the adaptive value of art in the biologist’s sense.

The difference between the biology question and the worth question can be dramatised by asking the same questions about our ability to read, where the facts are much clearer. Reading is undoubtedly desirable, valuable, and something we ought to promote and enhance—but it is just as undoubtedly not a biological adaptation. Written language only emerged about 5000 years ago, well after our species reached its current biological state. Unlike speech, it does not develop spontaneously in every child but must be acquired by learning, usually at school. Thus reading is not a biological adaptation, even if it makes possible much of what we value in life.

Now, compare reading with, say, the human capacity for genocide: wiping out every last member of an enemy. Needless to say, genocide is not a desirable human trait. Yet there are plausible arguments for its origin as a biological adaptation, namely the elimination of a threat and the usurping of contested resources.

So what exactly is a biological adaptation? It is a product of natural selection—the differential survival of replicators—which was discovered in the nineteenth century by Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace. In biology, the minimal criteria for identifying an adaptation are that it is species-universal, it reliably develops in individuals, and its causal effects would, in an ancestral environment (the one in which the adaptations were shaped) have improved its bearer’s prospects of survival and reproduction.
By-products, in contrast, are traits that have piggybacked on adapted traits. They are also sometimes called exaptations or spandrels (a term introduced by Richard Lewontin and Steven Jay Gould, referring to the spaces that are necessarily created between architectural structures: when a dome is supported on four arches, for example, there are tapering spaces between the arches as a consequence of the laws of geometry). In evolution, if certain traits are selected for, others will come along for the ride. An example is the redness of blood, which is a consequence of the laws of physics, unlike forms of pigmentation that evolved as camouflage or sexual ornamentation. Given the physical properties of oxygenated haemoglobin, and given that the uncontroversial function of haemoglobin is to carry oxygen to tissues, the fact that blood is red needs no further explanation.

A third source for biological traits (in addition to adaptations and by-products) is random genetic drift, in which certain traits get fixed in species by the luck of the draw (say, if all the bearers of one version of a gene happened to get struck by lightning).

Here is how to distinguish a by-product or random effect from an adaptation. First you have to specify the ‘goal’ of the putative adaptation. Of course evolution does not literally have goals, but it simulates goal-directed processes in the sense that it produces traits that appear to have been engineered for a specific purpose; for example, the ‘goal’ of the heart is to pump blood; or of the eye, to form and transduce an image.

Secondly, you have to characterise the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, or EEA: the world of cause and effect in which the trait was selected, which may or may not be the same as the world we live in today.

Hadza people on an overlook pointing to Lake Eyasi, Tanzania

The Hadza, or Hadzabe, are an indigenous ethnic group in the central Rift Valley and neighbouring Serengeti Plateau in north-central Tanzania. The Hadza number fewer than 1000, of whom some hundreds still live as hunter-gatherers.

The engineering of the human eye

Since the agricultural revolution, and accelerating with the industrial and information revolutions, we have so altered our world that survival circumstances now are very different from those prevailing through 99 per cent of human evolution.

Third—and this is critical—you have to lay out the engineering specs for a device that would obtain that goal in that environment. As you would for a device to pump water.

Notice that my points One, Two and Three are completely independent of the organism you are interested in, in our case, *Homo sapiens*. It is, deliberately, armchair theorising, not the result of actually looking at our species. Once you have done that—once you have *a priori* predictions about design, ones that are not circularly derived from what we know about the organism, then, you look at the organism itself, to see how well its traits match the engineering specs.

As an example, consider depth perception. First you can use pencil-and-paper geometry to show that comparing images between two eyes could meet the need to assess how far away something is.

That is *a priori* and could be done regardless of whether any real-life organisms actually use stereoscopic information. Indeed you could use those design specs for stereoscopic depth perception to build a robot that can see in depth. But now, empirically, you can look at your human beings (or other organism) and see if they really do use the disparity between the images in two retinas to calculate depth. If so, then you have increased confidence that depth perception is a bona fide biological adaptation. (You can be even more confident if very different species of organism end up with similar design features, suggesting that they have evolved a common solution to an engineering problem.)
Another example is fear of snakes, which appears to be a human universal.

Is it an adaptation? A herpetologist will tell you that many snakes are venomous—a fact that is independent of the emotional makeup of a human being. The congruence between the herpetologist's account of the venomous properties of snakes and a psychologist's account of the emotional properties of people increases the scientists' confidence that fear of snakes is an adaptation: that certain emotional reactions have become facilitated in the brain because people with automatic and therefore speedy defense responses to danger left more offspring than people without.

And one more: a sweet tooth. The biochemical information that sugar is a concentrated source of energy and the observation that people in all cultures like to eat sweet things are of course independent. However taking the two together, the a priori with the empirical, is a solid first step towards a sound hypothesis that a taste for sweets is an evolutionary adaptation.


The problem, from a rigorous scientific point of view, is that the putative benefit—e.g. bonding the group—is not something predictable by an independent engineering analysis. You could ask 'What does music do to you?' and subjects might answer 'It bonds our group'—which might be true; but to argue thence that music has an adaptive function in itself would be trying to explain one post-hoc fact with another.

A final requirement of a sound adaptationist hypothesis is that the outcome generated by the adaptation must benefit the entity that does the replicating. Benefits such as improving the happiness of the group, the harmony of the ecosystem, or elegance of the cosmos do not favour one breeding individual over another. For a replicating trait to be an adaptation, it ultimately has to increase the number of copies of that very replicator. This is the only known mechanism that can produce the appearance of engineering or design in the living world: design without a designer. Many current hypotheses about the origins of art fail to stand up to this requirement.

Even if a hypothesis does meet the criteria for being a legitimate adaptationist explanation, it still must stand up to empirical tests as an accurate description of human behaviour. One, that in my opinion, falls short on empirical grounds, is the popular hypothesis that art evolved through sexual selection as a signal of mate value, like a male bowerbird building and decorating a twiggy bower with coloured ornaments during the mating season to attract a mate.
According to this argument, art is a low-probability arrangement of matter, demanding of skill and cognitive resources. If you have what it takes to produce art you are flaunting your good genes. Unlike the Just-So stories, this is a sound and rigorous adaptationist hypothesis. It even seems to be supported by certain empirical observations, such as that artists are seen as sexy and are in fact sexually successful—Pablo Picasso and Mick Jagger are often cited as examples.

But the full empirical picture, I believe, is problematic for the sexual selection theory. The vast majority of artists—the senior citizens who sit on riverbanks painting Sunday sunsets, the high school music teacher who offers trombone lessons to nine-year-olds on the side—are neither motivated by attracting a mate nor perceived as particularly sexy. Nor can the experience of appreciating art be equated with being sexually attracted to the artist: I doubt the majority of visitors to Mona come to track down the contact details of artists in order to sleep with them (unlike the bowlerbird scenario, where displays are produced exclusively in a mating context). A simpler hypothesis for the Picasso/Jagger phenomenon is that anything humans are good at—moving, speaking, making things—makes them more sexually attractive. This has nothing specifically to do with art, and everything to do with outsize accomplishment of any sort.

There is certainly a connection between art and the psychology of status. The art historian Quentin Bell, in his 1947 book *On Human Finery* (a meditation on the history, sociology and psychology of fashion), points out that elite art has always been tied up with sumptuousness and excellence: magnificent buildings, jewel-encrusted regal or sacerdotal costumes, the highly skilled crafting of rare and precious materials that only the wealthy and powerful could afford.³³

Bell was inspired in turn by the American economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen’s theory of fashion, expounded in his iconic 1899 book *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, which suggests that the psychology of status may be explained by the principles of ‘conspicuous consumption’, ‘conspicuous leisure’ and ‘conspicuous waste’—in other words, only the wealthiest among us can throw money away on non-utilitarian ornaments and entertainments.⁴ More than a century later, the three-way connections among art, prestige and conspicuous expense have become increasingly apparent in the art world, where the spectacular costs of elite art have become a recurring point of discussion.
A good twenty-first century example is the story of Dasha Zhukova, wife of Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich (owner of the Chelsea Football Club) exhibiting in her private Moscow contemporary art gallery a Hanging Heart by American artist-star Jeff Koons (sold at Sotheby’s in 2007 for $US 23.6 million, then owned by French retail magnate François Pinault).

An interesting corollary of Veblen’s analysis is that the currency of conspicuous consumption and its kin changes dramatically in a world of mass production, where it is all too easy to fake the trappings of wealth, rendering them useless as a criterion by which elites may distinguish themselves from the bourgeoisie. Veblen was the first to point out that the trappings of the leisure pursuits of society’s topmost echelon became status symbols of the middle class, forcing the upper classes to constantly seek new and still less accessible signals to differentiate themselves.

Bell picked up where Veblen left off, identifying a phenomenon he called ‘conspicuous outrage’: the deliberate flouting of conventional standards of taste as a way of telling the world that one is so well-connected or secure in one’s status that one no longer has to care what anyone else thinks. As Bell summarised:

Fashionable exposure begins by shocking the vulgar, but it ends by establishing itself as a custom and thus ceasing to shock: its failure is implicit in its success. But so long as there is a development of the mode the quality of outrage is maintained.

This may explain some contemporary popular culture, where traditional standards of attractiveness are conspicuously flouted by transiently fashionable rebels and hipsters (Boy George, Ozzy Osbourne, Marilyn Manson and so on). It may also explain some conceptual art (and art writing) where conspicuous obfuscation is part of the mode by which the elite status of artists and collectors alike is maintained. As with conspicuous consumption, those who are not at the top of the status hierarchy soon start trying to imitate those higher up. So you get the psychology of hip and cool and a constant striving for novelty—in a world where visual imagery is disseminated more rapidly and widely and is often more easily copied than ever before. This hypothesis sees some forms of art as by-products of the psychology of status, rather than being adaptations in their own right.

So the psychology of fashion must be distinguished from the psychology of beauty or aesthetics. And both must be distinguished (at least conceptually) from the psychology of art. Aesthetics is the phenomenon in which human beings take pleasure from some kinds of perceptual experience. Aesthetics may be studied scientifically: one can ask what Homo sapiens finds beautiful, and ask whether these aesthetic responses are adaptations. One can then ask, as an independent question, about the ways in which artists use aesthetics in their work—or systematically choose not to—in order to achieve their aims. Anyone visiting Mona, indeed anyone thinking about the range of human art-making over the last fifteen or so millennia, knows that not all art is created simply to evoke a pleasurable aesthetic response.

Cloaca Professional
2010
Wim Delvoye

Bullet Hole
1988–93
Mat Collishaw
The psychology of aesthetics itself may be divided into a number of sub-topics. What makes faces and bodies beautiful? What makes environments beautiful? What makes colours, shapes and abstract patterns beautiful?

Let’s look at our fellow humans first.

Although people say that beauty is in the eye of the beholder, that is only somewhat true. There is also a common core of aesthetic responses beneath the undeniable variation across human cultures. Think about Nefertiti or Botticelli’s Venus—each a babe by modern standards.

Children agree on who is the prettiest or best-looking child in their group, and their judgements correlate with adults’. Babies gaze longer at pretty faces than not-so-pretty faces. And if you look across cultures, someone outside a culture will tend to agree with the people inside the culture as to who is the most attractive individual among the people within that culture. In an experiment by Dr. Victor Johnston at New Mexico State University, there was even agreement about artificial faces that were ‘evolved’ when images of randomly-varyied combinations of eye size, nose, lip thickness, jaw-shape and so on were judged by an online crowd-sourced group and narrowed down to the four most pleasing, which were then re-combined and re-judged, and so on, through several thousand generations. When I show the end result to my psychology students, there are certainly some appreciative oohs and ahhhs.
A specific contributor to the attractiveness of faces is having features of average size and shape. The greater the number of faces you put into a computer composite (which means that the resulting composite is increasingly average), the more attractive the composite becomes. This was discovered in the nineteenth century, when Francis Galton superimposed negatives of photographs of numerous convicted felons in a (misguided) attempt to discover the ‘archetype’ of the criminal face. Contrary to predictions, he stumbled over the fact that the physical average of a large number of faces will tend to be more attractive than the individual faces that went into it.

The averageness effect is something that could have been predicted a priori by an evolutionary biologist. Most of the variation seen within a population at any one time consists of mutations and developmental noise. In general, the average phenotype in a population is close to the optimum that natural selection is selecting for. There are obviously rare exceptions — otherwise there would be no evolution at all. However in any given snapshot in the evolutionary process, your best bet for fitness is the individual that is closest to the population average. And these probabilities have affected our aesthetic responses to faces.

More generally, at heart human beauty is an external cue to the biological fitness of others, especially as possible mates — we use beauty as a surrogate for a measure of the health and expected lifetime fertility of a potential co-parent. Crucially, one has to distinguish between what evolutionary biologists sometimes call proximate and ultimate explanations for our emotional responses. These are utterly different, and it’s important never to confuse them! A proximate explanation refers to what is actually going on in the minds of individuals as they react to or do something. An ultimate explanation refers to the selective pressures that were responsible for the proximate responses, namely which response actually increased the rate of reproduction of the individual’s ancestors over the long term. In this case, when I say that people are attracted to certain features of faces because they are cues to health and fertility (an ultimate explanation), it does not mean that they are (proximately) sussing out the person’s actual health and fertility in the hopes of having children with that person (or with that computer-generated composite) as soon as possible.
Other than averageness, what are those cues? Some are gender-neutral: they apply both to men looking at women and women looking at men. Most things that correlate with health make a person attractive—symmetry, clear skin, good teeth, a full head of lustrous hair. Conversely, many signs of disease, congenital disorders or aging make a face less attractive. Look at Heide Hatry’s Jennifer. Also, in general, good-looking faces tend to be symmetrical (think Denzel Washington versus Lyle Lovett) and this is true not only of humans, but a wide variety of species. In experiments, if you generate a symmetrical composite by combining one half of a face with its mirror image, that is enough to make it more attractive. And in studies with animals, random deviations from species-typical symmetry tend to make the animal less attractive as a mate. The ultimate reason is that corruptions in development, like those caused by parasites and mutagens, can disrupt symmetry. Brandon Ballengée’s frogs in the exhibition are an extreme example. They are fascinating to us, though the frogs themselves would have trouble getting dates.

As explained earlier, for something to be an adaptation there must be some independent criterion by which the adaptation can be shown to lead to better reproduction. In this case, it is that symmetry is an indication of successful development and hence a fitter mate.

Other cues to fertility are gender-specific, primarily so that prospective mates can accurately pick the opposite sex in the first place. For example, the effects of the hormone testosterone, which differentiates men from women, tend to make a male face more attractive—building up bone in the jaw and brow ridge—and a female face less so. In addition, because men and women have different lifetime trajectories of reproductive capacity (men don’t have the reproductive equivalent of menopause) and because women can be infertile if they are pregnant or breast-feeding (i.e. occupied with another man’s offspring), signs of youth and nulliparity, that is, not having borne previous offspring, are rated highly in female humans. These cues may be the common denominator behind otherwise disparate styles and fashions in beauty, seen, for example, across the subjects of François Boucher’s and Pierre-Auguste Renoir’s paintings in Paris 140 years apart.

Similar factors are at play in the differentiation of body shape, where the ratios between parts of the body that distinguish males from females, and that distinguish fertile people from infertile ones, are also perceptual criteria for beauty. For example, the waist–hip ratio (WHR) of a woman (the circumference of the waist divided by the circumference of the hips) is often used by endocrinologists as a quick visual way of assessing fertility before they even start testing for hormone levels. (Women store more fat around their hips to get them through pregnancy.) Research indicates that WHR is an accurate somatic indicator of both reproductive endocrinological status and long-term health, with 0.7 for women and 0.9 for men as the optima. That means that there is independent empirical evidence that attention to WHR is a legitimate way to estimate the fitness of prospective mates and hence is a candidate for a biological adaptation. Several studies have suggested that even though preferences for overall body size differs a great deal across cultures, countries and millennia, there is far less difference in people’s preferences for certain body proportions.¹

¹ The significance of this as an indicator of attractiveness was first theorised by evolutionary psychologist Devendra Singh at the University of Texas in 1993; for his recent update on the concept, see Devendra Singh, ‘Mate value at a glance: Relationship of waist-to-hip ratio to health, fecundity and attractiveness’, Neuroendocrinology Letters, special issue, suppl. 4, vol. 23, December 2002, pp. 81–91.
Artificial displays, whether designed for commercial advertising or flattering portraiture, often exaggerate the features that men and women find attractive, producing what biologists call 'supernormal stimuli'—those that fall outside the range found in nature and that elicit a greater-than-normal response from perceivers. Clothing, cosmetic surgery, makeup, exercise regimes and photoshopping all work in similar ways, creating images of men with outsize shoulders and narrow hips, or the anatomically improbable bust–waist–hip ratios of a contemporary Barbie™ doll.

Here again, a trait that is exploited by artificers can be shown to have a basis in our evolutionary biology. The concept of a supernormal stimulus was first proposed by the Dutch biologist Nikolaas Tinbergen, who shared a Nobel Prize in 1973 for his contributions to ethology. Tinbergen showed that an artificial object could be a stronger stimulus or releaser for an instinct than the natural object for which that instinct originally evolved. For example, a garish yellow stick with three red stripes elicited a higher rate of pecking by seagull chicks than a realistic effigy of their parent’s bill, which has only one red spot.7

Reproduction doesn’t just depend on mating, of course; it also requires that we protect, nourish, teach and cherish the results of mating, which is to say, children. Another ethologist, Konrad Lorenz, who shared the Nobel with Tinbergen, noted that the geometry of young faces and bodies produces a desire to protect and nurture that creature—the feature we call ‘cuteness’. As with all cues to beauty, artificers may exaggerate these signs into the supernormal range, such as in teddy bears, anime and children’s cartoons. In an essay on the evolution of Mickey Mouse, the biologist Stephen Jay Gould showed how Disney animators increasingly designed the ‘cuteness’ features identified by Lorenz into those of the famous rodent as he came to represent the company.8

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7. Nikolaas Tinbergen (1907–88) shared the 1973 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine with Karl von Frisch and Konrad Lorenz for their work on animal behavior. His important publications include The Study of Instinct (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1951) and The Herring Gull’s World (Collins, London, 1953). Tinbergen showed that herring gull chicks respond more enthusiastically to a stick with painted red and yellow markings than to their feeding parents.

Our aesthetic reactions to the natural world also may be explained, at least in part, as responses to cues to evolutionarily propitious things. Some of these cues may be seen in depictions of plants and animals, from the caves of Lascaux to soporific motel art. Humans are deeply interested in animals: we eat them; they eat us. Our fates are enmeshed with theirs and that makes them objects of fascination.

We like flowers for a different reason: they are a potent biological cue for selecting a productive environment—since flowers now can mean fruit later. Thus we have evolved a fascination with the visual appearance, habitat, and the reproductive cycles of living things upon which humans depend for food and other necessities. And we can indulge this fascination through botanical art and works of great ornithological beauty such as John James Audubon’s *The Birds of America* or John Lewin’s *Birds of New Holland*. Flowers, fruit and leaves also have proliferated on ceramics, decorative carving, metalware and jewels for centuries. Textiles and wallpaper designs using outsize and often unnaturally coloured floral motifs are other supernormal stimuli that give us visual pleasure.
Cattleya Orchid, Two Hummingbirds and a Beetle

Martin Johnson Heade

Who Says Your Feelings Have to Make Sense

(art)

2009

Aspasia Harnisbaki
What about landscapes? The ability to select a place to live and breed is fundamental to survival, and has led in *Homo sapiens* to aesthetic and emotional responses to certain kinds of geographical features. This is the theory proposed by the distinguished biologist Gordon Orians: the zoological phenomenon that animal behaviourists call ‘habitat selection’ is the same as the psychological phenomenon that artists and landscape architects call ‘environmental aesthetics’. Once again, our eye for beauty is not an inexplicable preference for arbitrary shapes and colours but can be understood as an instinct for choosing surroundings that are safe, healthful and informative. Essentially, humans seek safe, legible, fertile, life-supporting environments, and find beauty in representations that distil and concentrate these cues, such as the availability of water, the presence of flowering and fruiting plants and large animals, an elevated perspective, views to the horizon, and protected vantage points—a family of cues that has been summed up as ‘prospect and refuge’.

Orians proposes that the single optimal habitat for a human is something close to the African savannah in which our ancestors evolved. But it’s clearly not our only habitat. Humans are a weedy species that now inhabits most of the globe, that we are sufficiently adaptable to move into less hospitable environments when necessary. Nonetheless, 90 per cent of human evolution was spent in the savannah: semi–open grassland with clumps of trees and bodies of water. Perhaps not coincidently, when people engineer an environment to be attractive—Capability Brown laying out an eighteenth-century English gentleman’s estate, for example, or John Glover painting an indigenous Tasmanian Arcadia—it will often have the salient features of a savannah, sometimes more than a savannah itself!

Urban planners and landscape architects implicitly understand these principles, designing parks, golf courses and pedestrian-friendly cities that impart a feeling of calm. They evoke a response in which you want to stay a while and explore around the next bend, and it feels like it should be easy to work out where everything is and how to get to where you want.

As I have been emphasising in the case of other aesthetic reactions, though, aesthetics is not the same thing as art. Sophisticated, postmodern, conceptual and avant–garde artificers may deliberately choose not to design the prettiest or more comfortable scene. Perhaps some of the architectural features of Mona itself were designed to be disconcerting in a way that forces people to challenge their own conventional and comfortable surroundings.
Cognitive legibility is yet another general feature of visual aesthetics: though I have introduced it in connection with landscapes, it applies to every other visual experience.

Everything we see begins as a pattern of light falling upon our retinas. Light reflects off an object, is focused by the cornea and lens as an image on the retina, which then stimulates rods and cones (the photoreceptors that convert varying intensities into neurophysiological activity). Those signals are sent through the optic nerve to the visual cortex in the back of the brain. Imagine a spreadsheet consisting of a million numbers, each corresponding to the intensity of light at one spot on the retina. There are no faces there, no leaves, no chairs, no cars, no clothing—just numbers. What the brain must do is crunch those numbers and extract from them the three-dimensional arrangement of surfaces and objects in the world that gave rise to that spreadsheet.

This feat of perception is not a passive process. Our brains have evolved to seek out certain non-random patterns, the better to infer the presence, shapes, and compositions of three-dimensional objects. And these demands may have given rise to another dimension of visual aesthetics. The brain is constantly asking, ‘Can I make sense of the pixels coming in from the eyes?’, and it gives us a sense of cognitive satisfaction when we can do so. It feels good when your visual system is functioning; when you are successfully focusing your eyes to give yourself a sharp image and converging them so you are not seeing double. It also feels good to be in a parsable environment; one where you can see where one object ends and the next one begins.

It is no accident that many of the criteria for patterns that we find pleasing in photographs and decorative art correlate closely with maximum extraction of information. Information-rich visuals—those with colour, contrast, sharpness, symmetry, repetition, separation of figure from background, perspective—are all more pleasing to look at than blurry, muddy, obstructed, washed out, chaotically arranged patches, to say nothing of undifferentiated sludge or random pixels. Not coincidentally, these are the kinds of patterns that correlate with the presence of coherent and potent objects in the world, including plants, animals, humans and their products.

Even abstract patterns, such as symmetrical decorations, or life like but not living patterns such as ‘smiley’ automobile grilles, are often supernormal versions of the kinds of information that a visual system looks for in making sense of the world.
Once again this does not mean that sophisticated art can be equated with stimuli that tickle our basic aesthetic responses. Artists will sometimes deliberately challenge the viewer’s unconscious ability to make sense of the visual world. An excellent example that sits at the intersection of art and visual perception is Ron James’s photograph of Woody the Dalmatian dog, first published in Life magazine in 1965 and reproduced in many psychology textbooks and monographs. Paintings by op artists like Bridget Riley also exploit the surprise and puzzlement of displays that defy the brain’s ordinary expectations on how patterns in the eye correlate with objects in the world.

To sum up: I’ve explored the hypothesis that art—or at least many forms of art—exploit visual aesthetics for no direct adaptive reason. Making and looking at art does not, and probably never did, result in more surviving offspring. There are, to be sure, adaptive explanations why certain visual patterns give human beings aesthetic, intellectual and sexual pleasure: they are cues to understandable, safe, productive, nutritious or fertile things in the world. And since we are a toolmaking, technological species, one of the things that we can do with our ingenuity, aside from trapping animals, detoxifying plants, conspiring against our enemies and so on, is to create purified, concentrated, supernormal, artificial sources of these visual pleasures, just for the sheer enjoyment experienced by both maker and viewer. Often an artist will combine many of these cues into a single work—the work will not only depict a biologically interesting object, person or scene, but do so with bold colours, shapes, symmetries and repetitions, using rare materials and requiring extraordinary craftsmanship. The philosopher Nelson Goodman referred to this feature of compelling art as ‘repleteness’. In other words many works of conventional visual art are things we have invented in order to enjoy them. Conversely, many works of subversive, challenging, sophisticated and postmodern art are invented to defy these sources of easy pleasure and thereby force viewers to reflect on their ordinary expectations and conventional responses.

In explaining the hypothesis that conventional art is a pleasure technology, I once used the analogy of cheesecake: something we enjoy not because natural selection specifically adapted us to do so, but because we invented it for our own enjoyment. (Admittedly, connoisseurs of art hate the analogy, because it seems to disrespect their subject, but my goal was clarity, not flattery.) What is the adaptive function of cheesecake?—The answer is, obviously, none. Cheesecake is a by-product of our evolved tastes and our evolved inventiveness. This doesn’t mean that we can ignore adaptation in understanding why people like cheesecake: each kind of ingredient was adaptive in the world in which we evolved. It is a package of supernormal doses of things that in more moderate and natural amounts clearly were adaptive, like sugar, fat, protein. But if you ask ‘Why is cheesecake adaptive?’, you are posing the wrong question. Humans are intelligent enough to collect things that in their natural settings were wholesome or useful and use them to create bombs of pure pleasure.

Why do we make cheesecake? Why do we make conventional art? Because we can.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF STATUS
CONSPICUOUS DISPLAY, CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION

Mortuary amulets mounted as a modern pendant
Egypt, Late Period, 26th Dynasty, c. 664–525 BCE; possibly mounted by Cartier, 20th century
Virgin and Child with Saints
Triptych of the Madonna and Child with saints and angel musicians within a hortus conclusus (central panel), the Emperor Charlemagne, St Helena, and donor (left-hand shutter panel), and St Peter and St Margaret (right-hand shutter panel)
Cologne School, c. 1510–20
Kantharos
Pentelic marble, Greek, c. 300–250 BCE

Parure in fitted case, comprising necklace, nine brooches, bangle and hair ornament
Italy or France, c. 1840
Wasekaseka—neck ornament
Fiji, 19th century
Anthropoid sarcophagi for a man and a woman
North Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Mangbetu people, eastern neighbours of the Nyala, 20th century
Shrine panel
Nigeria, Kalabari group, Ijo people, mid-20th century
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BEAUTY
FACES AND BODIES
Jeune femme se baignant
(Young Woman Bathing)
1888
Pierre-Auguste Renoir

Architectural relief depicting two celestial female figures (Surasundaris)
Madhya Pradesh, India, Chandella period, c. 900–1200, 10th–11th century
Kneeling ancestor figure
Egypt, most probably 25th Dynasty, c. 770–657 BCE

Funerary head covering for a man
Egypt, Roman period, c. 100–400 CE
Teucer
1900, cast c. 1904
Hamo Thornycroft
Loïe Fuller
c. 1900
François-Raoul Larche
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BEAUTY
ANIMALS AND PLANTS

Bowl with aquatic decoration
(Nile perch and lotus)
Egypt, New Kingdom, 18th Dynasty
c. 1550–1295 BCE
Feline effigy vessel  
Central Arizona, America, Anasazi, 1200–1500 CE

Red-figure skyphos depicting an owl  
Athens, Greece, 500–400 BCE
Cow with lowered head
Nimrud, Mesopotamia (modern Iraq), Neo-Assyrian, 9th–8th century BCE
Dish
c. 1580–1620
School of Bernard Palissy
Glazed tile
Damascus, Syria, Ottoman period (1290–1922), 16th century

Dish, with tulips and poppies
Turkey, Ottoman period (1290–1922), 16th century
Plate with botanical decoration

Partridge tureen
Thuringia, Germany, c. 1760
Study of Varied Flowers with a Hummingbird

Study of Three Magnolia Blossoms

Cattleya Orchid, Two Hummingbirds and a Beetle
Lobster
Japan, Meiji era (1868–1912), c. 1880

Crab
Japan, Meiji era (1868–1912), c. 1880
Beyond the Frame
2006
Lin Jiun-Ting
Aures rubri cuniculorum, capite
Beet-dyed Rabbit Ears, Heads of Baby Mice and Cow Eyelashes
2013
Heide Hatry

Pinnae caudales cancrorum,
Pinnae caudales cancrorum,
Präputium penis porci
Tail Fins of Crabs, Forelegs of Pig
2013
Heide Hatry
Plica vocalis gallinae
(Vocal Cord of a Chicken)
from the series 'Not a Rose'
2010
Heide Hatry

Parvalae partes ventris tauri, linguae antitum
(Small Parts of Stomach of Bull and Duck Tongues)
from the series 'Not a Rose'
2007
Heide Hatry
Who Says Your Feelings Have to Make Sense?

Aspassio Haronitaki
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BEAUTY
PROSPECT AND REFUGE

The Bath of Diana, Van Diemen’s Land
1837
John Glover
Scene on the Hudson
C. 1864
William Sonntag

The Wheat Field
1876
John Clayton Adams
Playing flute in a pine forest, the joy of quietude

2000

Kim Hoa Tram
Peter Booth
Untitled 1994/95
1994–95
Bill Henson
Amphora: The Woodhouse amphora
Cyprus, Cypro-Archaic II, 750–600 BCE
Shell necklace
Oaxaca, Mexico, Mixtec,
Early Post-Classic, 950–1050 CE
Shell necklace
1995
Val Macsween
Collecting basket
1994
Audrey Frost
Woven mat
1994
Audrey Frost
Shell necklace
2015
Lola Greeno

Shell necklace
1995
Lola Greeno
Butterfly mask
Burkina Faso, West Africa, Bwa people, 20th century
Gaifu kaisei
(Fuji in Fair Weather)
from the series
‘Thirty-six Views of Mount Fuji’
c. 1830–32
Katsushika Hokusai

Tökaidö Hodogaya
(Hodogaya on the Tökaidö)
from the series
‘Thirty-six Views of Mount Fuji’
c. 1830–32
Katsushika Hokusai
Remember 1964
Bridget Riley
LIST OF WORKS

VIRGIN AND CHILD WITH SAINTS:
Triptych of the Madonna and Child with saints and angel musicians within a slender cross— Centre St Séverin and Assisi (left-hand shutter panel), St Bénézet and St Margaret (right-hand shutter panel).  
Cologne School, c. 1520–30  
Oil on oak (three oak panels)  
230 x 454 cm (total, 229 x 454 cm)  
National Gallery of Australia, Canberra  
Purchased with the assistance of James S. Fairstein AO and the Nerses Asdrossian Bequest, 2009 (NGA 2009.011.A–C)

MODERN
1960
Friedensreich Hundertwasser  
Born 1928, documentary, London, England; died 2000, Vienna, Austria  
Triptych of the Madonna and Child  
C. 1550–1295  
Egypt, New Kingdom, 18th Dynasty, c. 1350–1295 BCE  
Funerary head covering for a man  
Emperor Kannon, 6th–7th century  
Japan; mounted by Hiroshi Tada  
Unrealised  
Purchased 1892  
Art Gallery of New South Wales, Sydney (2000.006)

PAPYRUS IN BOX, COMPRISING MAKERS’ MARKS, WINE LABELS AND HIRONDELLE  
Italy or France, c. 1940  
Chased and embossed gold (unlisted, non-tarnished), repoussé  
Various dimensions  
National Gallery of Australia, Canberra  
Purchased 1993 (2003.155)

1996
Ann Porteus, Sidewalk Tribal Gallery  
Born 1974, Sandusky, OH, USA; lives and works in New York, NY, USA  
Stained Pacific tree frog collected in Aptos, California in scientific collaboration with Peter Sessions  
Barely visible  

Parure  
Italy or France, c. 1840  
Plaster, pigment, with inset glass  
9 x 4.5 x 14 cm  
Mona  
2001.002

1984
François-Raoul Larche  
Born 1850, London, England; died 1912, Paris, France  
Gift of John Connell, 1913  
57 x 52 x 15 cm; diameter as worn  
Conférence  
Purchased 1884 (1885.0421; 1885.0422; 1885.0423)

1982
Hamo Thornycroft  
Born 1856, Scarborough, England; died 1925, Oxford, England  
Anthropoid sarcophagi for a man  
Eastern neighbours of the Ngata, Papua New Guinea, early 20th century  
Private collection  
Purchased 1982 (1985.042)

1974
Brandon Ballengée  
Born 1974, Sandusky, OH, USA; lives and works in New York, NY, USA  
DFA 156: Persephonē  
9 x 4.5 x 14 cm  
Mona  
2002.006

1968
Frederic Leighton  
Born 1830, Scarborough, England; died 1925, Oxford, England  
Gift of John Connell, 1913  
116.8 x 86.4 cm  
Mona  
2000.006

1966
James O. Fairfax AO and the Nerissa P. Fairfax Bequest, 2006  
John Hargrave, Hargrave Fine Arts, New York  
Twin figure of a nymph and a woman  
Hitherto found in India, Asia, and Africa, 6th century CE  
National Gallery of Australia, Canberra  
Purchased 2006 (2006.006)

1965
James & Diana Ramsay Fund, Adelaide  
Hedi Slimane  
Born 1961, Marrakech, Morocco; lives in Casablanca, Morocco  
Decoration for a man  
116.8 x 86.4 cm  
Mona  
2004.071

1964
François Boucher  
Born 1703, Paris, France; died 1770, Paris  
Gilded bronze electric lamp in the shape of the American dancer, Loïe Fuller  
116.8 x 86.4 cm  
Mona  
2003.155

1963
Sessions  
Born 1974, Sandusky, OH, USA; lives and works in New York, NY, USA  
Unique digital print on Arches wove paper, painted and stained Pacific tree frog collected in Aptos, California in scientific collaboration with Peter Sessions  
Barely visible  

1960
Jean-Jacques Lebel  
2007–11  
by Anne Schofield AM, 2002  
Gift of John Connell, 1913  
8 x 4.5 x 14 cm  
Mona  
2002.006
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Artist</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lobster</strong></td>
<td>William Blake</td>
<td>1798</td>
<td>Oil on canvas</td>
<td>51 x 41 cm</td>
<td>National Gallery of Victoria, Melbourne</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cloud Japan, Moji-ura (1869–1872)</strong></td>
<td>James McNeill Whistler</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>Oil on canvas</td>
<td>71 x 60 cm</td>
<td>Art Gallery of South Australia, Adelaide</td>
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<td><strong>Beyond the Empire</strong></td>
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**Note:** The list includes various artworks from different artists and periods, with details on dimensions and locations.
**LIST OF WORKS**

Gaifu Kaisei (Fuji in Fair Weather) from the series ‘Thirty-six Views of Mount Fuji’ c. 1830–32
Katsushika Hokusai
Born 1760, Edo, Japan; died 1849 in Edo (Tokyo)
woodblock print
24.2 x 36.5 cm
Art Gallery of South Australia, Adelaide
South Australian Government Grant 1976 768G84

Letter Rack c. 1698
Edwaert Collier
Born 1642, Breda, Netherlands; died 1708, London, England
Oil on canvas
Art Gallery of South Australia, Adelaide
Gift of James & Diana Ramsay and the James & Diana Ramsay Fund through the Art Gallery of South Australia Foundation 1991 909P23

Butterfly masks Burkina Faso, West Africa, 20th century
Wood, pigment
54 x 74 cm
Mona 1999.013; 1999.014

Jetter Rock c. 1698
Edward Gullier
Born 1691, Bruges, Flanders; died 1763, London, England
Oil on canvas
Art Gallery of South Australia, Adelaide
Gift of Mrs Jervis & Mrs Bownas in memory of the late Wilfrid Bownas 1948 48.5.1

God’s Kitchen (Fig. 15 in Fair Weather) from the series ‘Thirty-six Views of Mount Fuji’ c. 1830–32
Katsushika Hokusai
Born 1760, Edo, Japan; died 1849 in Edo (Tokyo)
woodblock print
14.2 x 15.2 cm
Art Gallery of South Australia, Adelaide
South Australian Government Grant 1976 768G28